I'm sure that you'll be able to find a definition of "thunder and lightning" on Urban Dictionary this evening if -- oh wait, never mind, there already is one...
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I really, really want to study and understand the CA ruling on this one. Essentially, I have three questions:
(1) It seems to me that one can stretch the definition of "relevant sexual history" pretty far and still technically lie within the law. If I understand it, the relevant previous and future experiences in R v. Evans included the complainant repeating a particular phrase that is not actually all that remarkable. So why does it become so relevant, or call into question her alleged inability to consent specifically? It seems to me that in case (a) I would have the same question -- maybe she enjoys that position, while drunk as well as when sober, but if she genuinely has no memory after the fact then it doesn't seem to me to change the assessment much. If it were her favourite then could it not just be the position she naturally turned to when well out of it?
(2) But anyway, the previous sexual history seems vaguely irrelevant if the defendant could not previously have been aware of it. If Ann and Bob had never previously met then Bob can hardly argue that his understanding of consent was based on her previous sexual history that, by definition, he knew nothing of. So, again, why isn't it totally irrelevant in that case (again, this appears to me to be true in R v Evans as it was admitted that the two didn't know each other and hadn't met until Evans walked into the room with her on the bed with McDonald).
(3) Presumably the problem, too, is that in each of the cases described, as well as the recent one that prompted this, the sexual activity was "superficially" consensual in some sense and that just muddies the waters. I hate the use of that phrase but what I mean is that I am wondering if juries are struggling to appreciate the subtlety of "reasonable belief" of consent. In R v. Evans it can be argued that Evans wasn't totally cognisant of the issues surrounding alcohol and consent, and taking his account to be true it seems that the complainant appeared fairly enthusiastic at the time, so his belief that she had consented seems to me to be on the borderline between reasonable and not. I would maintain that it was on the wrong side, as he should have considered that maybe she was rather drunk, and anyway what with her already having sex with McDonald, she was already in a vulnerable position and might have struggled to say no even if she wanted to. But with respect to these cases what I am suggesting is that because the sex could have appeared to be consensual on a superficial level, the previous sexual history could tip the delicate balance of "reasonable belief or not" even though it's not actually relevant. Take a more extreme case (d), where there can be no doubt that the alleged sex was non-consensual, but Bob's lawyers discover that Ann had a previous history of "rape fantasy" sex, ie roleplaying a scenario where she is raped, although during the roleplay the sex is in fact consensual. (This is actually a thing, for some people). Could Bob attempt to offer up a defence whereby she says it was rape to the police, but in fact this was an extension of her previous roleplaying? And if not, why not?
It seems to me that the CA ruling in Evans v. R *does* risk leaving these sorts of question rather horribly open, and that troubles me.
In answer to each of your three cases, I would suggest that (b) and (c) are certainly not relevant. and (a) is *probably* not relevant, but it does seem unclear what is to be relevant or not. And why couldn't the defence just argue in each case that it's up to the jury to decide whether or not the history is relevant?
Finally, in R v. Evans, why don't the new witness statements not also suggest that the woman had been, effectively, raped three times and not just by Evans?