Another part of outsiders' (and not so few insiders' too) analysis is that a major part of the UK's problems since even before WWII is that it persists in posturing as a major power, full of importance and strength. The fall of Singapore (at the hands of soldiers on bicycles, of all things) exposed the falsehood of this and it has certainly been steadily downhill from there. If only the UK could bring itself to face and admit the truth that today it is a rather poorly organised average/mediocre country then it could begin to sort itself out. Instead of posing as "one of the world's superpowers" and invading etc. other countries at the drop of Washington's hat, the UK would perhaps have been in a position to become a true net receiver within the EU as it actually needed to be and (had it the guts to face forward toward the future instead of continually trying to prop up a disappearing vision of a glorious past) actually had the means, if not the will/desire to deal with the myriad of systemic problems in its structure, systems, etc. Someone who wants to be thought of as top dog does not ask for or even accept sympathy as being needy. The question has been suggested: Did the UK actually imagine themselves unilaterally (well, by forming "alliances" tied to their will á la the past) deciding EU policy and when that was not going to happen they lost interest ? It has also been suggested that Charles de Gaulle, who spent the WWII years in the UK, knew the British only too well and anticipated that the British would be difficult and therefore did not relish their attitudes becoming part of the mix.