Free Speech V "hate Crime"
These are extracts from a "general comment" adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee at its 102nd session (11‑29 July 2011) on the subject of freedom of opinion and freedom of expression:
“3. Freedom of expression is a necessary condition...for the promotion and protection of human rights...
47. Defamation laws must be crafted with care to ensure that they comply with paragraph 3, and that they do not serve, in practice, to stifle freedom of expression. All such laws ... should include such defences as the defence of truth[i...
48. Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant [I assume that's the Declaration of Human Rights], except in [specific circumstances]...[i]Nor would it be permissible for such prohibitions to be used to prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of faith[i].
49. [i]Laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant imposes ...to protect freedom of opinion and expression]. The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events [So it's OK to deny the holocaust. VE]... ”
These rather robust principles seem incompatible with the modern concept of "hate crime" and the various laws adopted to penalise it.
I'll give you an example. If I were to ridicule the doctrines of Mormonism and comment unfavourably on the character and sexual practices of the movement's founder, Joseph Smith, I might well upset a lot of Mormons. It could be plausibly argued that my ridicule and denigration were creating a negative view of the faith and, by implication, its followers, and, even if my criticism fell short of "incitement to hate", what I said and how I said it were hurtful and divisive. On those grounds, given the plasticity in the legal formualtion of hate laws, could I not be legitimately prosecuted?
So let's look at a putative VE in the dock situation and his possible defence using the principles above. Paragraph 48 would be my principle argument. But, hang about, there are those "specific circumstances" exceptions. So, proceed. Now I'm defending myself in particular against the "defamatory" reference to Joseph Smith as a sexual predator. Paragraph 47 ought[i to get me off that one under any [i]normal] defintion of "sexual predator". But suppose I've got the facts wrong, can't I then appeal to paragraph 49?
You see the dilemma. On the one hand the provisions of the "general comments" appear to provide a perfect defence. On the other hand the hate crime laws allow broad scope for subjective interpretation: if it is determined that my criticism was driven by hatred of Mormons, or that it could plausibly incite hate towards Mormons in others then you have a "specific circumstance" which trumps anything the "Covenant" might say..
What say you?