The Computer Said `'no`' - With A Vengeance ?

[Canary42]

Disgraceful from US Company Boeing and US Regulator FAA.

Profits before people - again.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/boeing_two_deadly_crashes

The rogue allegedly was MCAS - more like SCAM by Boeing Management.

What next ? Are we at risk of the US Dirty Tricks Brigade trying to sabotage a few Airbuses ?

[AKMild]

The drawback with advances in technology such as MCAS is that it can de-skill the operators, in this case pilots. On a smaller scale, but probably just as validly, the evolution of car safety measures (e.g. smart braking) risks de-skilling car drivers. On the aircraft front, the fact that it is such a specialist skill to audit FAA/other regulations means that the work will always be outsourced to such outfits as Boeing, i.e. they effectively become self-regulating, which is dangerous for a commercial concern that deals in people's safety.

[Peter Pedant]

hamas flying airplanes again - fitfully - erotically even

I imagine the american civil litigation system will adequately intervene

knowing a risk and 'running it' as we risk engineers say
is fraught when one is found out

(but people do and get paid off for it)

[Peter Pedant]

and canary
can you please not write in a style that seems to an infelicitous cross between Lady Caroline Lamb ( breathless - usually to Lord Byron, almost as mental as she was) and three-T ( incomprehensible )
just for me - - thanks

[gingejbee]

^^now that's interesting. PP criticising a poster's style as being "incomprehensible"....

[mushroom25]

//The rogue allegedly was MCAS //

that's what manifested - but there's much more to it than that. boeing needed a quick competitor to the new version of the A320 - no time to design a new airframe, but the 737 airframe was not suited to the new breed of fuel efficient engines. MCAS was meant to compensate for the handling issues created by the engines, but boeing didn't see the need to tell the airlines about a system that was supposed to operate in the background. MCAS made the max perform/handle like an "old" 737 so the training upgrade required was minimal - e-distance learning and an online self-exam. of itself a faulty MCAS shouldn't have brought down a 737-max, the fact that the crews knew nothing of the system, never mind couldn't see what it was doing because the indicator was an "optional extra", meant when it went wrong, they had no clue how to deal with it.

aircraft design is expensive. training is expensive. any shortcut that will minimise both is too attractive to ignore. the FAA's "hands-off" approach did the rest.

the whole system is at fault, and it should not be imagined that airbus are any different. they've only been lucky because the A320 airframe design is 25 years younger than the 737.