Quizzes & Puzzles48 mins ago
Why Are They Still Making The 737 Max?
30 Answers
https:/ /www.bb c.co.uk /news/b usiness -490262 85
Surely no one will ever get on one again anyway.
Surely no one will ever get on one again anyway.
Answers
The 737 had old and inefficient engines and they were losing a lot of customers to the European Airbus. To design a totally new aircraft from scratch would have taken too long and Boeing could go out of business, so a modification of the existing 737 was the solution. Because the new engines were taller and bigger, the had to be mounted higher (to give ground...
12:47 Sun 21st Jul 2019
mushroom:"there was a faulty sensor. this would not of itself cause loss of the aircraft; what did that was the crew were totally unprepared for the failure and didn't know how to work around it. " - not true, the crew did the correct thing multiple times but the plane believed it was stalling and overrode them, this was, as you say, due to a faulty sensor. Assuming it is otherwise correct, software is only as good as the information it is getting, thus you can never be certain the sensors are correct thus software should always be overridable.
//the crew did the correct thing multiple times but the plane believed it was stalling and overrode them//
yes, the crew did what they believed was the correct thing. unfortunately for them, they didn't know that as an automated (silent) corrective measure, the MCAS was given full authority to force the nose down, and further that this could not be overridden by pilot resistance against the trim wheel.
the correct work around would have been to isolate MCAS; however they didn't know what the system was doing, never mind know if it was even possible to isolate. not being trained and appraised on what the MCAS was actually doing is what did for the crew and QED, the aircraft.
yes, the crew did what they believed was the correct thing. unfortunately for them, they didn't know that as an automated (silent) corrective measure, the MCAS was given full authority to force the nose down, and further that this could not be overridden by pilot resistance against the trim wheel.
the correct work around would have been to isolate MCAS; however they didn't know what the system was doing, never mind know if it was even possible to isolate. not being trained and appraised on what the MCAS was actually doing is what did for the crew and QED, the aircraft.
yes. a MAX without MCAS is perfectly flyable, it just needs different techniques training to the crews so that they know how to handle it. as Gromit said Boeing didn't want that because of the potential high cost of transition training from the old fleet and because airlines may potentially need 2 pools of crew.
//Remember the DC10? //
the DC10 sustained a number of very high profile accidents in its early days. the cargo door affair was of McDonnell-Douglas's own making; AA191 and united 232 were caused by design flaws exposed by outside events (191 by a non-standard maintenance process, and 232 by a fan blade with a flaw it it - both compromised the hydraulic systems).
by the time of its wholesale retirement by 2014, the DC10's overall safety record was comparable with many second generation jet aircraft. I've flown in them many times and despite their tendency to be slow to take off (just clearing the threshold fence at Calgary on one occasion) they were eventually a fine old workhorse.
the DC10 sustained a number of very high profile accidents in its early days. the cargo door affair was of McDonnell-Douglas's own making; AA191 and united 232 were caused by design flaws exposed by outside events (191 by a non-standard maintenance process, and 232 by a fan blade with a flaw it it - both compromised the hydraulic systems).
by the time of its wholesale retirement by 2014, the DC10's overall safety record was comparable with many second generation jet aircraft. I've flown in them many times and despite their tendency to be slow to take off (just clearing the threshold fence at Calgary on one occasion) they were eventually a fine old workhorse.
parts of the elevator wings were ripped off a DC10 over Luxembourg in 1979, but this was caused by aerodynamic overloads because the crew didn't realise they'd stalled and then (to compound it) assumed the buffeting was caused by the no3 engine and shut it down. only later did they realise what was really going on and recover the stall.
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