ChatterBank4 mins ago
Credit Where It's Due.......
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...finally something radical and popular from Labour. Yes abolish the Lords well the house of Lords anyway, let them keep their bauble but create a new elected upper house.
...finally something radical and popular from Labour. Yes abolish the Lords well the house of Lords anyway, let them keep their bauble but create a new elected upper house.
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Having an English Parliament is a poor alternative to abolishing the existing national assemblies who, IMO, tend to be a waste of politicians' salaries and a cause of conflict. But a national government for the UK nation is surely a necessity. No other nation abolishes it's national government and does without.
We're all obviously going to have radically different ideas about how to reform things, but one aspect that strikes me as common is how low-priority Lords Reform seems to be in all of these proposals. The radical overhaul of local governance, whatever form that takes, and restructuring of the Commons, seem to me to be much more important. By contrast, the make-up of a primarily amending chamber whose powers are limited by the Parliament Acts (1911, 1948) strikes me as less urgent -- though I do agree that we should reform that too.
It would be enough, in my opinion, to reduce the size of the Lords, removing for example all Hereditary and Spiritual Peers and halving the size (by, say, imposing a term limit of 15 years and in future slashing the number of new political appointments), without abolishing it altogether or turning it into an elected body.
It would be enough, in my opinion, to reduce the size of the Lords, removing for example all Hereditary and Spiritual Peers and halving the size (by, say, imposing a term limit of 15 years and in future slashing the number of new political appointments), without abolishing it altogether or turning it into an elected body.
Depends what you want it to be *for*, really. If the Lords stays as an amending chamber, subordinate to the elected Commons, then the need for it to be directly elected is somewhat less, and it surely becomes more important to ensure that the "amenders" are technically well-versed and apolitical. (Of course, there's a lot of politics in the Lords currently, so this in itself still leaves room for reform.)
But by contrast, any elected body could claim to have more power as a result. For example, suppose the Lords are elected by, say, some form of proportional representation. Then firstly its members are obliged to heed political forces, rather than purely serve as an amending body; and secondly, it could even argue to be more representative of the UK as a whole than the FPTP Commons, and claim more power as a result.
In my ideal picture, I suppose I see the Lords as filled with only what we'd now term "cross-bench" peers: business leaders, technical experts in the relevant fields, scientists, maybe a few with political experience; and with appointees serving strict term limits of, say, no more than 15 or 20 years. In this sense, you get a useful balance: the Commons remains supreme, because ultimately the will of the people in Parliament must win; but the "Lords" serves as a useful quality control, ensuring that the legislation passed by the Lords has the necessary technical input and debate so that it can be effective. But, in particular, you get a balance where it remains clear as to who should win. In a system like the US, for example, where the (elected) Senate is the Lords and the (also elected) Representatives the Commons, their powers are effectively equal in terms of crafting legislation, leading to situations where the two "compete" against each other -- in recent years especially, leading to stagnation where very little of significance is achieved at the Federal level. There are multiple other issues with how things work in the US, but it's definitely one issue that each body can claim electoral legitimacy, even when they aren't aligned the same way, so that there's no way to resolve deadlock by appealing to who ought to be the "senior" in terms of representing the people.
How this applies in the UK in future I don't know, but at the very least I think it's clear that the Commons couldn't claim supremacy for historical reasons if the Lords is redesigned so as to be elected. But the new House of Lords' role would have to be clearly laid-out, and its make-up should reflect that, and I don't think this should necessarily mean direct election.
But by contrast, any elected body could claim to have more power as a result. For example, suppose the Lords are elected by, say, some form of proportional representation. Then firstly its members are obliged to heed political forces, rather than purely serve as an amending body; and secondly, it could even argue to be more representative of the UK as a whole than the FPTP Commons, and claim more power as a result.
In my ideal picture, I suppose I see the Lords as filled with only what we'd now term "cross-bench" peers: business leaders, technical experts in the relevant fields, scientists, maybe a few with political experience; and with appointees serving strict term limits of, say, no more than 15 or 20 years. In this sense, you get a useful balance: the Commons remains supreme, because ultimately the will of the people in Parliament must win; but the "Lords" serves as a useful quality control, ensuring that the legislation passed by the Lords has the necessary technical input and debate so that it can be effective. But, in particular, you get a balance where it remains clear as to who should win. In a system like the US, for example, where the (elected) Senate is the Lords and the (also elected) Representatives the Commons, their powers are effectively equal in terms of crafting legislation, leading to situations where the two "compete" against each other -- in recent years especially, leading to stagnation where very little of significance is achieved at the Federal level. There are multiple other issues with how things work in the US, but it's definitely one issue that each body can claim electoral legitimacy, even when they aren't aligned the same way, so that there's no way to resolve deadlock by appealing to who ought to be the "senior" in terms of representing the people.
How this applies in the UK in future I don't know, but at the very least I think it's clear that the Commons couldn't claim supremacy for historical reasons if the Lords is redesigned so as to be elected. But the new House of Lords' role would have to be clearly laid-out, and its make-up should reflect that, and I don't think this should necessarily mean direct election.
//Overcomplicated, just define it like now except they are elected and there's no where near as many//
I tend to prefer the aphorism, "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."
I don't think that just electing the Lords, in the same manner as MPs, would work with the idea that their role is different, and indeed lesser, at all well. Who'd want to stand for election to a lesser body with presumably no real power except to tinker at the edges? What benefit does making an amending chamber political actually serve? If you elect the Lords, then how do you ensure that it retains the technical expertise necessary -- that it does still have, even among all the guff and political appointees -- when election campaigns become based on popularity rather than necessarily on competence?
I think one thing we can easily forget is that the skill of winning elections is radically different from the skill of doing something once you've won: great campaigners don't always make great legislators. Never mind that many (or even most) MPs we have currently get the job on the strength of their parties' leaders, and their ability to convince the local party representatives to select them as candidates, rather than because they are individually suited for the job -- and, likewise, many capable MPs lose seats because of the fortunes of the wider party independent of their own performance in the role.
I don't think my approach is overly complicated (obviously) -- I think it acknowledges the problems that are inevitable whenever you have two bodies involved in making the law. Their roles must be clearly defined, and their composition must therefore be designed with these roles in mind. Whether to elect; how to elect; how long they serve for; who can be a candidate. And so on.
I tend to prefer the aphorism, "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."
I don't think that just electing the Lords, in the same manner as MPs, would work with the idea that their role is different, and indeed lesser, at all well. Who'd want to stand for election to a lesser body with presumably no real power except to tinker at the edges? What benefit does making an amending chamber political actually serve? If you elect the Lords, then how do you ensure that it retains the technical expertise necessary -- that it does still have, even among all the guff and political appointees -- when election campaigns become based on popularity rather than necessarily on competence?
I think one thing we can easily forget is that the skill of winning elections is radically different from the skill of doing something once you've won: great campaigners don't always make great legislators. Never mind that many (or even most) MPs we have currently get the job on the strength of their parties' leaders, and their ability to convince the local party representatives to select them as candidates, rather than because they are individually suited for the job -- and, likewise, many capable MPs lose seats because of the fortunes of the wider party independent of their own performance in the role.
I don't think my approach is overly complicated (obviously) -- I think it acknowledges the problems that are inevitable whenever you have two bodies involved in making the law. Their roles must be clearly defined, and their composition must therefore be designed with these roles in mind. Whether to elect; how to elect; how long they serve for; who can be a candidate. And so on.
If this country is to have any claim to trying to be a "democracy" both chambers have to be elected chambers. It's bad enough they don't ask constituents what the public's view is, as it is.
Wouldn't just leave it like that. We should want only a portion of the Upper House elected at a time in order to provide hysteresis in the House composition and avoid sudden swings in direction which one might later regret. IMO the term should be longer too, for stability, and it needs to avoid being elected anywhere near the time of a Commons GE. Ideally political parties should be barred so there is minimal incentive to vote one way in accordance with their favoured Commons political party. They are supposed to be giving their unbiased view.
Wouldn't just leave it like that. We should want only a portion of the Upper House elected at a time in order to provide hysteresis in the House composition and avoid sudden swings in direction which one might later regret. IMO the term should be longer too, for stability, and it needs to avoid being elected anywhere near the time of a Commons GE. Ideally political parties should be barred so there is minimal incentive to vote one way in accordance with their favoured Commons political party. They are supposed to be giving their unbiased view.
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